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ABSTRACT
Cloud storage services, like Dropbox and Google Drive, have
growing ecosystems of 3rd party apps that are designed to
work with users’ cloud files. Such apps often request full ac-
cess to users’ files, including files shared with collaborators.
Hence, whenever a user grants access to a new vendor, she is
inflicting a privacy loss on herself and on her collaborators
too. Based on analyzing a real dataset of 183 Google Drive
users and 131 third party apps, we discover that collabora-
tors inflict a privacy loss which is at least 39% higher than
what users themselves cause. We take a step toward mini-
mizing this loss by introducing the concept of History-based
decisions. Simply put, users are informed at decision time
about the vendors which have been previously granted ac-
cess to their data. Thus, they can reduce their privacy loss
by not installing apps from new vendors whenever possible.
Next, we realize this concept by introducing a new privacy
indicator, which can be integrated within the cloud apps’
authorization interface. Via a web experiment with 141 par-
ticipants recruited from CrowdFlower, we show that our pri-
vacy indicator can significantly increase the user’s likelihood
of choosing the app that minimizes her privacy loss. Finally,
we explore the network effect of History-based decisions via
a simulation on top of large collaboration networks. We
demonstrate that adopting such a decision-making process
is capable of reducing the growth of users’ privacy loss by
70% in a Google Drive-based network and by 40% in an
author collaboration network. This is despite the fact that
we neither assume that users cooperate nor that they ex-
hibit altruistic behavior. To our knowledge, our work is the
first to provide quantifiable evidence of the privacy risk that
collaborators pose in cloud apps. We are also the first to
mitigate this problem via a usable privacy approach.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Rise of Cloud Apps:
The popularity of consumer cloud storage providers (CSPs)
over the previous decade has been on a roll. Dropbox,
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Google Drive, and One Drive have each amassed hundreds of
millions of users. In order to further appeal to their users,
the CSPs have been transitioning from being pure service
providers to becoming app ecosystems. Hence, they now of-
fer APIs for developers to import and process users’ files
stored in the cloud. Consider, for example, a web app called
PandaDoc, which allows creating, editing, and signing doc-
uments online. When a user uses PandaDoc from her laptop
browser, she can import files stored in her Google Drive in-
stead of her hard drive. Such a pattern is increasingly more
prevalent with the growing number of 3rd Party Cloud apps
(or 3PC apps) that are tightly integrated with cloud stor-
age services. Dropbox alone claims that hundreds of thou-
sands of apps have been integrated with its platform. Even
in the enterprise setting, 3rd party cloud apps are on the
rise. This is first because companies are officially adopting
the likes of Dropbox Business, OneDrive for Business, and
Google Drive for Work. Second, it is due to employees uti-
lizing their personal cloud accounts to share company’s files
(a.k.a Shadow IT). Various reports from cloud application
security providers state that organizations use from 10 to 20
times more cloud apps than their IT department thinks [22,
4].
Risks in 3rd Party Cloud Apps:
However, in our previous work, we have shown that 76% of
the 3rd party Google Drive apps featured on Google Chrome
Store request full access to users’ Google Drive data [9].
Around 64% of these apps are over-privileged : they require
more permissions than are needed for them to function. Ac-
cordingly, users are now faced with a new kind of privacy
adversary: the 3rd party app vendors. With every app au-
thorization decision that users make, they are trusting a new
vendor with their data and increasing the potential attack
surface. Elastica, the cloud application security provider,
estimates that the average financial impact on a company
as a result of a cloud-storage data breach is $13.85M, in-
cluding remediation costs [3]. In 2015, the data breach at
Anthem, a US insurance company, has reportedly cost more
than $100M, with 80M unencrypted health records leaked.
This was a result of an exfiltration exploit leveraging a pop-
ular public cloud storage application [4]. Even on the per-
sonal level, the risk extends from breaches exposing financial
information and health records to unnoticeable, continuous
profiling based on stored files.
Exposure through Collaboration:
An additional intricacy is that when users grant access to a
3rd party cloud app, they are not only sharing their personal
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data but also others’ data. This is because cloud storage
providers are inherently collaborative platforms where users
share and cooperate on common files. Hence, protecting
these files is not solely in the hands of the user. Skyhigh Net-
works, another provider of cloud security software, reports
that 37.2% of documents (across 23 million users) are shared
with at least one other user. In organizations, documents
are shared, on average, with accounts from 849 external do-
mains [23]. Moreover, around 23% of cloud documents were
found by Elastica to be “broadly shared”, which means that
they are shared (a) among all employees, (b) with external
partners and clients, or (c) with the public [4]. Interest-
ingly, 12% of those documents contained compliance-related
or confidential data. This further highlights what has been
termed as the interdependent privacy problem [2], where the
decisions of friends can affect the user’s privacy and vice-
versa. This concept was initially proposed in the context of
third-party social networking apps, such as Facebook. How-
ever, while 1.92% of Facebook apps request friends’ personal
information, this is much more pronounced in 3rd party
cloud apps, where all apps accessing one’s files get access
to the part which is shared too. Moreover, unlike Facebook
apps, due to the collaborative nature of cloud apps, the CSPs
do not provide an option for users to control whether their
collaborators’ apps can get access to data they own.
Research Questions:
So far, the main approach to reducing the risk of 3PC apps
has been focused on discovering over-privileged apps and de-
terring users from installing them [9]. Even then, a lot of
users would still install such apps as they prioritize short-
term utility over long-term risk aversion or due to the ab-
sence of alternatives. Furthermore, that approach relies on
manually inspecting each app by experts and on applying
a plethora of machine learning algorithms to visualize the
various risks for users. These issues could present a hurdle
towards a wide-scale deployment by CSPs. In this work, we
address the wider problem of minimizing the risk of all 3PC
apps, regardless of whether they are over-privileged or least-
privileged. We are further driven by the rationale that users
will inevitably continue to install apps to achieve various ser-
vices. Hence, instead of stopping them, we aim to lead them
to select apps from vendors in a way that minimizes their
privacy risk. We achieve this by leading users to take what
we term as History-based decisions. Such decisions account
for the vendors who previously obtained access to the user’s
data, whether directly (with her consent) or via her collab-
orators. Our strategy consists of introducing privacy indi-
cators to the current permissions interfaces that help users
minimize the number of vendors with access to their data.
Our “usable privacy” approach is guided via a data-driven
study and is evaluated via a data-driven simulation.
In essence, we tackle the following research questions:
• From a practical perspective, are the collaborators’ deci-
sions significant enough to be accounted for in users’ app
adoption decisions?
• Do users already account for entities with access to their
data? If not, to what extent can the usage of privacy
indicators lead to users taking History-based decisions?
• How significant is the effect of adopting these privacy in-
dicators in the case of large networks of users and teams?
Contributions: Towards addressing these questions, we
make the following contributions:
• In Section 3, we analyze a real-world dataset of Google
Drive users, and we show that the median privacy loss
that collaborators cause by installing apps can be much
higher than that inflicted by the user’s own app adoption
decisions (39% higher with 5% of shared files and 523%
higher with 60% of shared files). To our knowledge, this
is the first usage of a real-world dataset to give a concrete
evaluation of interdependent privacy in any ecosystem.
• Driven by the significant impact of collaborators, we de-
sign new privacy indicators for helping users mitigate the
privacy risk via History-based decisions (cf. Section 4).
We assess these indicators via a web experiment with 141
users. We show that they significantly increase the likeli-
hood that users choose the option with minimal privacy
loss, even if not all of these users are motivated by privacy
per se. To the best of our knowledge, this is also the first
work to investigate a usable privacy approach to mitigat-
ing the problem of interdependent privacy. The few stud-
ies on this problem have mainly approached it from a the-
oretical perspective, such as developing game-theoretic or
economic models [2, 16] or from a behavioral perspective,
such as studying the factors affecting real users’ monetary
valuation of others’ privacy [17, 18].
• We explore the potential of History-based decisions by
performing a simulation on two large user networks. We
show that the network-effects of our approach result in
curtailing the growth privacy loss by 70% in a synthetic
Google Drive-based collaboration network and by 40% in
a real author collaboration network. We also simulate the
effect of such decisions in a teams’ network. We demon-
strate that teams can reduce the privacy loss by up to 45%
by solely accounting for team members’ decisions (cf. Sec-
tion 5).
2. MODELS AND PRELIMINARIES
2.1 System Model
There are four main entities that interact in the third-
party cloud app system:
1. a user u who uses that app for achieving a certain service
2. a cloud storage provider (CSP) hosting the user’s data
3. a data subject to whom the files belong and whose privacy
is being considered. We further define two levels of data
subject granularity:
• individual-level granularity : i.e., the user herself is in-
terested in guarding her own data privacy,
• team-level granularity : i.e., a group of users are inter-
ested in guarding the privacy of team-owned data (e.g.,
using an enterprise version of cloud storage services)
4. a vendor v that is responsible for programming and man-
aging a 3rd Party Cloud app (or shortly a cloud app or
a 3PC app). These vendors register their apps with the
CSPs. The apps themselves are hosted on any website
the vendors choose (i. e., not hosted by the CSP itself).
Notation Explanation
u user
v vendor
C(u) Collaborators of u
Vu set of vendors authorized by u
Vc(u) set of vendors authorized by collaborators of u
VFCu(V ) file coverage due to the vendors in set V
Fu set of files of u
Fu,v set of files of u accessible by vendor v
Table 1: Summary of notations used
Each user has access to a set Fu of files stored at the
CSP. A subset of these files is owned exclusively by the data
subject while the other subset is composed of files that are
each shared with at least one other collaborator. We denote
the set of all collaborators of user u by C(u). For simplicity
reasons, we will assume throughout this work that the files
of all data subjects, as well as the collaborators for each file,
are all fixed from a reference step t = 0. Using the CSP’s
API, the vendor v can get access, at step t ∈ N, to the
subject’s data upon user authorization, which consists of u
accepting a list of permissions. We will alternatively refer
to this as app installation, and we will assume that exactly
one app is installed at each step t. Permissions are named
differently across various providers, but, in general, we can
categorize them into three categories:
• per-file access: where the user has to authorize the ven-
dor for each file access individually. This is typically done
via a file picker provided by the CSP itself.
• full-access: where the vendor gets access to all users’
data. In the interface, this is worded, for instance, as
“View the files in your Google Drive” or “access to the
files and folders in your Dropbox”.
• per-type access: where the vendor gets access to all
files of a specific type. For example, Dropbox words it as
“access to images in your Dropbox”. Some platforms, like
Google Drive, do not provide app developers with such
fine-grained options.
The authorization can also give v access to files shared
with the collaborators of u. Similarly, collaborators of u can
install apps that expose files shared with u to new vendors.
We denote the set of files of u accessible by vendor v at step
t as Fu,v(t)
1.
2.2 User Model
A user is further assumed to be self-interested, i. e., only
caring about optimizing the privacy of the data subject
(a.k.a., privacy egoist), and non-cooperative, i. e., does not
coordinate her decisions with others. We do not assume
that the risks of installing each app are known to the users
or calculated a priori. In fact, unlike other 3rd party app
ecosystems, the risk of each cloud app cannot be automati-
cally estimated based on techniques such as taint tracking [5]
or code analysis [6] because the main app’s functionality is
1Although we do not consider file deletion in this work, we note
that, in the worst case, the vendor can still have access to copies
of files it saved before the user deleted them.
typically implemented on the server side (which cannot be
accessed by external entities). Such assumptions constitute
the worst case in the scenarios we consider, and further pri-
vacy optimizations can be obtained by relaxing them.
We also assume that the mental model for privacy-concerned
users matches the possible permission granularities they are
given. Accordingly, privacy-concerned users can have one of
the following privacy-goal granularities2:
• per-type privacy goal: where users aim to optimize
their privacy independently for different file types. For
example, in an ecosystem like Dropbox, where per-type
access is an option, users might follow the separation-
of-concerns principle. Hence, they might install photo-
related apps from a set of vendors that is different from
the set authorized for document processing.
• all-files privacy goal: where users aim to reduce the
privacy risk for their entire set of files. This can be in
the case of ecosystems which do not have the option of
per-type access, like Google Drive. It can be also the case
that a user of Dropbox has this goal in mind despite being
presented with finer-grained app permissions.
2.3 Threat Model
We consider the 3rd party app vendors as the adversary
(and not the CSP). The privacy indicator we introduce is
best implemented by the CSP, which already has access to
the users’ and collaborators data. Alternatively, this can be
a feature within Cloud Access Security Brokers (e.g., Sky-
High Networks, Netskope, etc.), which are already trusted
by thousands of enterprises to protect their cloud data against
other 3rd parties. Moreover, we consider the protection
against over-privileged apps as an orthogonal problem, which
we have considered in [9]. We rather focus on the interde-
pendent privacy problem, which covers all vendors with full
access and is an issue in least-privileged apps too.
2.4 Privacy Loss Metrics
In order to quantify the privacy loss that a user incurs with
time, we introduce now the Vendors File Coverage (VFC)
metric. Consider a user u and a set V of vendors at a certain
time step. For notation simplicity, we will omit the time step
henceforth. VFCu(V ) is computed as the summation of the
files’ fractions shared with each of these vendors:
VFCu(V ) =
∑
v∈V
|Fu,v|
|Fu| (1)
Intuitively, VFCu(V ) increases as vendors in V get access
to more files of u. It has the range [0, |V |]. 3
If we consider the set Vu of vendors explicitly authorized
by user u, we can define the Self-Vendors File Coverage as:
Self-VFCu = VFCu(Vu) (2)
Similarly, if we consider the set VC(u) of vendors autho-
rized by the collaborators C(u) of u, we can define the
Collaborators-Vendors File Coverage as:
Collaborators-VFCu = VFCu(VC(u)) (3)
2Per-file access already achieves the least privilege possible.
3We do not normalize VFCu(V ) by |V | as multiple vendors with
access to all the user’s files induce a higher privacy loss than one
vendor with such access.
Finally, the Aggregate VFCu for a user u is that due to all
vendors authorized by u or its collaborators:
Aggregate-VFCu = VFCu(Vu ∪ VC(u)) (4)
Throughout this work, we will use the terms privacy loss
and VFC interchangeably. As will become evident in Sec-
tion 4, this metric choice allows relaying a message that is
simple enough for users to grasp, yet powerful enough to
capture a significant part of the privacy loss. Obviously,
one can resort to a deeper inspection of content or meta-
data sensitivity (as in [8]) had the purpose been finding the
best privacy model in general. However, for instigating a
behavioral change, telling users that a company has 30%
of their files is more concrete than a black-box description
informing them that the calculated loss is 30% and consti-
tutes less information-overload than presenting them with
detailed loss metrics.
3. COLLABORATORS’ IMPACT
At this point, we are in a position to handle the first re-
search question on the extent of collaborators’ contribution
to a user’s privacy loss. Hence, we want to test the following
hypothesis:
H1: The collaborators’ app adoption decisions have a sig-
nificant impact on the user’s privacy loss.
If this hypothesis is valid in practice, it provides a strong
motivation for designing privacy notices that aid users in ac-
counting for their collaborators’ decisions, which is what we
will study in Section 4. Towards that, we will be dissecting
the privacy loss, quantified by VFC , that users incur in a
realistic 3rd party cloud apps dataset.
3.1 The Case of Google Drive
To study the problem in a realistic context, we will be
taking Google Drive as a case study in this work, given that
it has one of the most popular 3rd party ecosystems. Never-
theless, the insights gained from our work are applicable to
other cloud platforms as well. The main (content-related)
Google Drive permissions that 3PC apps’ vendors can re-
quest are presented Table 2, along with the Google-provided
description for each. This short description is also presented
to the user when installing an app (see Figure 1 for an ex-
ample app). The user can click on the info button i next to
each permission to read additional explanations in a popup.
The user has to accept all permissions in order to utilize the
app. These apps can be found on Google Chrome Web Store
(and other Google stores), where users can rate and review
them. In this work, we will focus on content-related per-
missions. Hence, as discussed in Section 2, we differentiate
between two levels of access: (1) full access, which includes
the drive readonly and drive permissions and (2) per-
file access that includes the drive file permission. Google
Drive does not offer the per-type permissions option.
3.2 Dataset
One of the main challenges when studying the privacy loss
in 3rd party cloud apps is the absence of public datasets with
realistic file distributions, collaborator distributions, sharing
patterns, 3rd party app installations, etc. We benefit in this
section from a dataset that we have collected in a previous
Permission Short Name
View the files in your Google Drive. drive readonly
View and manage the files in your
Google Drive.
drive
View and manage Google Drive files
that you have opened or created
with this app.
drive file
View your Google Drive apps. drive apps readonly
Table 2: Requested permissions with the short reference
name
Figure 1: Current permissions interface of Google Drive
work via the PrivySeal4 service [9]. We build our analysis
on it in order to evaluate the VFC of users in a realistic
context. The dataset, henceforth referred to as the Privy-
Seal Dataset, was anonymized and contained metadata-only
information. It included a subset of the files’ metadata of
183 PrivySeal users in addition to the Google Drive apps
installed by those users prior to authorizing PrivySeal’s app
(the drive apps readonly permission was requested by
PrivySeal). Each user had a minimum of Nfiles min = 10
files in total and at least Pmin shared = 5% of files that are
shared. The dataset specifically contained:
• list of user IDs (anonymized via a one-way hash function);
• IDs of files in each user’s Google Drive,
• list of anonymized collaborators’ IDs for each file ID;
• list of apps with full-access installed by each user;
• the vendor of each app.
In total, the number of users in addition to collaborators
was 3422. Overall, these users had installed 131 distinct
4https://privyseal.epfl.ch
Google Drive apps from 99 distinct vendors. Figure 2 char-
acterizes the PrivySeal Dataset. Particularly, it displays 4
distributions in this dataset, which realistically model the
system under study:
• number of files per user, which follows a skewed distribu-
tion with a median of 67 files
• sharing pattern: percentage of shared files out of all user
files, which also follows a skewed distribution with a me-
dian around 18%
• number of collaborators across all user files (a.k.a., the de-
gree of the user node in the collaboration network): where
75% of the users had less than 23 collaborators
• number of vendors authorized per user: also follows a
skewed distribution with a median of 1 vendor per user
3.3 Results
We computed the Self-VFC, the Collaborators-VFC, and
the Aggregate-VFC (as defined in Section 2.4) for users in
the PrivySeal Dataset5. As we did not have the actual num-
ber of apps for each collaborator of users in the dataset, we
assigned to these collaborators a set of apps from a random
user of the dataset. We show in Figure 3 how these metrics
evolve as we gradually consider populations that collaborate
more frequently. With Pmin shared = 5%, we had a median
of 1.39 for Collaborators-VFC, which was 39% higher than
a median of 1.00 for Self-VFC. The significance of the me-
dian difference is evidenced by the non-overlapping box-plot
notches. This difference became much larger when we con-
sidered users that share more files. We had a 100% median
difference at Pmin shared = 10% and 523% median difference
at Pmin shared = 60%. Such results indicate that:
• The collaborators’ app adoption decisions contribute a
core component to the user’s privacy loss, thus confirming
our hypothesis H1.
• The higher the number of collaborators is, the higher the
magnitude of loss these collaborators can potentially in-
flict.
Both conclusions motivate the need for taking collaborators’
decisions into account when designing privacy indicators for
cloud apps, which is what we will embark on next.
4. USER STUDY
Up till now, we have confirmed that, if users want to min-
imize their privacy loss, they are better off not ignoring the
app installation decisions of collaborators. In this section,
we tackle the next research question, where we investigate
the potential of privacy indicators in leading users to mini-
mize their exposure to 3PC app vendors. We show first our
design methodology for the privacy indicators, and we fol-
low that by a web experiment that investigates the efficacy
of these indicators in realistic scenarios.
5To avoid double counting, we considered the vendors authorized
by both the user and her collaborators in computing Self-VFC
but not in computing Collaborators-VFC.
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Figure 3: Evolution of metrics with populations that share
more files (Nfiles min = 10, Napps min = 1). The numeric labels
denote the corresponding number of users in the dataset.
4.1 History-based Privacy Indicators
We call our proposed privacy indicators“History-based In-
sights” (HB Insights) as they allow users to account for the
previous decisions taken by them or by their collaborators.
We continue to consider Google Drive as a case study, and
we show this indicator in the context of Google Drive apps’
permissions in Figure 4. Compared to the current inter-
face provided by Google (Figure 1), we added a new part
to highlight the percentage of user files readily accessible by
the vendor (computed based on VFCu({v}) for each vendor
v). As we prove in Appendix 9, selecting the vendor that
already has the largest percentage of user files is the opti-
mal strategy to minimize the privacy loss in our context.
We denote this strategy as “History-based decisions”. Fol-
lowing the best practices in privacy indicators’ design [19],
our indicator was multilayered, with both textual and visual
components. The wording of the main textual part was brief
Figure 4: Proposed“History-based insights” interface, with
the buttons from the user study in the bottom
Figure 5: Example app displayed in the list of apps
and general enough to hold for both the data percentage ex-
posed by friends and that exposed by the user. We used a
percentage value rather than a qualitative measure to facil-
itate making comparisons among apps based on this value.
The visual part showed the percentage as a progress bar
with a neutral violet color. The bottom textual part was
added in a smaller font to provide further explanation for
those interested. We used the term “company” in our inter-
face instead of “vendor” as it is more commonly understood
by the general audience.
4.2 Methodology
In order to evaluate the new permissions interface, we per-
formed an online web experiment (rather than a lab study)
as we were mainly motivated by obtaining a large sample of
users that is also geographically and culturally diverse. The
hypothesis we wanted to test is:
H2: Introducing the new privacy indicator significantly
increases the probability that users take History-based de-
cisions.
In addition, the study allowed us to build a realistic user
decision model based on the choices taken by participants in
different conditions. We will utilize this model in Section 5
to simulate the app choices in a large user network and to
study the effect on the overall VFC in the network. We
structured our study to have (1) an Introductory Survey,
(2) a series of App Installation Tasks, and (3) a Concluding
Survey.
User Recruitment: We recruited users via CrowdFlower’s
crowdsourcing platform. In our study, we restricted partic-
ipation, via the platform’s filtering system, to the highest
quality contributors (Performance Level 3). We also geo-
graphically targeted countries where English is a main lan-
guage as our interface was only in English. In order to fur-
ther guarantee quality responses, each user was rewarded a
small amount of $0.5 for merely completing the study and
an additional amount of $1.25 that was manually bonused
for those who did not enter irrelevant text in the free-text
fields.
Instructions: Participants were first presented with intro-
ductory instructions that explained the context of the study
(i. e., cloud storage services and 3rd party apps that can be
connected to them). They were asked to only continue if
they had good familiarity with cloud storage services (e. g.,
Google Drive, Dropbox, etc.). We did not explicitly require
that participants have experience with 3rd party cloud apps.
However, we educated them about such apps throughout the
instructions, particularly showing them two examples of 3rd
party apps in action (PandaDoc for signing documents and
iLoveIMG for cropping photos). These apps were displayed
via animated GIFs that play automatically and do not rely
on the user clicking. We used limited deception by neither
mentioning the focus of the study on participants’ privacy
nor giving hints about selecting apps based on the instal-
lation history. The advertised purpose was to “check how
people make decisions when they install 3rd party apps.”
Introductory Survey: After checking the instructions,
users were presented with an introductory survey, where
they first entered general demographic information. This
survey was also front-loaded with questions about cloud
storage services (several of which required free-text input)
in order to discourage users who had not used these services
from continuing to the actual study.
4.3 Study Overview
Next, users could proceed to the study page. We used a
split-plot design in the study. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two groups:
1. Baseline Group (BL): where the permissions interface
used is that currently provided by Google Drive (Fig-
ure 1).
2. History-based Group (HB): where the History-based
Insights permissions interface (Figure 4) is used.
In each group, the study consisted of 3 modules, which
cover the main conditions that can occur when users desire
to install a cloud app. On a high level, the modules investi-
gate the following questions:
1. Module 1: are users likely to select apps from the
same vendor they installed from before?
2. Module 2: are users likely to select apps from vendors
that her collaborators have used before?
3. Module 3: do users consider the differences in access
levels obtained by vendors that collaborators installed?
In all modules, whenever the user was asked to choose
an app, she was presented with a list of 12 apps (Figure 5
shows an example app). Only two of these apps were rel-
evant to the task purpose, and they were placed on top of
the list (randomly positioned as first or second). With this
setup, we wanted to mimic the realistic setup of app brows-
ing while not squandering the user’s effort on finding apps.
All apps had the same full access permissions too (namely
drive permission). Unlike in Chrome Store, we removed
elements such as ratings, user reviews, and screenshots and
kept a minimal interface. This is all in order to reduce the
distractions from factors outside the study. We refer the user
to the work of Kelly et al., [11] who investigated the effects
of those elements on users’ decisions for Android apps.
In order to account for fatigue and learning effects, mod-
ules 1, 2, and 3 were presented in a random order for users.
We piloted our experimental setup in two stages: with col-
leagues and with online users from the CrowdFlower com-
munity itself. For reviewing the online pilot testers work,
we embedded a Javascript code for session recording in our
study’s web page, which allowed us to view the user’s mouse
and keyboard actions on our side.
Demographics: We had 157 users who completed the study.
Based on manually reviewing the users’ inputs, we removed
16 users who were inputting irrelevant free-text in the survey
in the study. We thus report the results of 141 users, 72 of
which were in the BL group and 69 in the HB group. In Ta-
ble 3, we describe the participants’ demographics based on
the introductory survey. Of these participants, 66.4% were
males and 33.6% were females. They were between 18 and
62 years old, with a median of 31. Moreover, 42.3% of the
participants had worked or studied in IT before. Partici-
pants were mostly from India (37%), USA (35%), Britain
(7%), Germany (7%), and Canada (7%).
CrowdFlower presents the users with an optional satisfac-
tion survey after completing the study, and 49 users took this
survey. On average, the study received 4.2/5 for instructions
clarity, 3.8/5 for questions’ fairness, 3.8/5 for ease of job,
3.6/5 for pay sufficiency (before the bonus was rewarded).
This ensures that participants’ behavior has not been af-
fected by either a lack of time to complete the task or the
task design in general.
4.4 Study Details and Results
We now move to the detailed description of the modules
and the results obtained. These modules are summarized in
Figure 6, to which we refer henceforth. We also show sample
screenshots from the online study in Figure 7. The results
are also presented in Table 4.
Module 1 (Self-History Scenario): tests whether the
user is more likely to select an app from the same vendor
she has just installed from before. In step (a), the user is
made aware the she installed an app from a specific vendor v
(Figure 7b). In step (b), she is asked to install6 an app that
satisfies the given purpose (Figure 7c) among a list of apps.
Two of the listed apps were relevant, and one of them was
from vendor v itself.
6Users were informed that this is a role-playing study, and no
apps were actually installed.
Age 18-62 (median 31 years)
Gender 35.5% Female
64.5% Male
Occupation 59.6% full-time employees
14.2% student
6.4% part-time worker
8.5% self-employed
5.0% homemaker
6.4% Unemployed/retired
IT Experience 41.8% Have worked or studied in IT
Degree 19.1% High school
7.1% Trade/tech./vocational training
51.1% Associate or Bachelor’s degree
22.7% Post Graduate Degree
Countries 35.0% USA
37.5% IND
7.5% GBR
6.9% DEU
6.9% CAN
7.4% AUS+IRL+ NLD + PAK
Table 3: Demographics in our user study; N = 141
Despite the participants being informed one step earlier
that they installed an app from “thetimetube.com”, that did
not make a difference in the BL case: half of the users still
chose the app from the new vendor “nitrosafe.org” (cf. Ta-
ble 4. In the absence of traditional signals that users follow
for deciding on apps (reviews, ratings, permissions), partici-
pants apparently made decisions that cancelled out, making
the two apps equally favored across participants. The vast
majority of users were not approaching the installa-
tion from the angle of keeping their data with fewer
shareholders. Based on their provided justifications, they
rather looked for other cues, such as selecting the app that,
in their opinion, has a more comprehensive description, a
more professional logo, a better sounding name, or a more
trustable URL. Still, 12 users have explicitly mentioned in
their text input that they chose an app because it is from
the same vendor they have dealt with earlier. Even then,
neither of them has alluded to a privacy motivation behind
the choice. These 12 participants mainly provided cross-app
compatibility, interface familiarity, and satisfaction with the
previous vendor as justifications. For example, one partici-
pant wrote: “I favoured Malware Scanner due to the fact that
the name ‘thetimetube.com’ was in the last app installed, and
I tend to install apps from the same company due to cross-
app compatibility usually found in apps by the same com-
pany.” Interestingly, two users justified their installation
of the app from the new vendor (nitrosafe.org) by writing
that they had just installed an app from the same company
before. This indicates that, even when users try to ac-
count for previous decisions, they might find it dif-
ficult to remember the previous app vendors. Given
that our study had a short time span separating the current
from the previous installation, we expect that such mistakes
would be even more common in real scenarios when app
installation instances are separated by longer time spans.
The HB group witnessed a much larger proportion of users
who favored the option with less privacy loss. 72.2% of the
Figure 6: Summary of the experiment modules; a sample
of the questions corresponding to each step are available in
Figure 7.
participants selected the app from the “thetimetube.com”
(the vendor which already has access). The difference of
22.8% compared to the BL group is statistically significant
(Fisher’s exact test, p-value = 0.005). Many of the partici-
pants who chose the app from “thetimetube.com” reported
that they were motivated by the 100% access that the app
already has. We counted around 40 such users (i. e., 57% of
the HB group). Some of them went further and explicitly
mentioned that their selection was motivated by giving data
to fewer data owners (i. e., more privacy). For example, one
user wrote: “This company has access to all my files, so I
would choose them as I don’t want to have 2 companies with
full access to my files”.
In a nutshell, we were able to verify our hypothesis in
this scenario: the new privacy indicator leads users
to more frequently choose the app from a vendor
they already authorized. Furthermore, we have discov-
ered that the HB Insights interface has indirectly made users
think about various positive effects brought by using apps
from the same vendor. This eventually lead them to make
more privacy-preserving decisions.
Module 2.1 (Collaborator’s App Scenario): tests the
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(a) Instructions presented to users at the beginning of a module
(b) Module 1; Task a : Vendor Familiarity
(c) Module 1; Task b: App Selection
(d) Module 2; Task a: Collaborator Awareness
(e) Module 2; Task b: Vendor Familiarity
(f) Module 3; Task a: Collaborator Awareness
Figure 7: Screenshots from the user study
likelihood that the participant selects the same app that her
collaborator had used. In step (a), the participant is made
aware that she had shared all her photos with a friend f
(Figure 7d). For more familiarity, we also added a picture
for each of the two fictitious friends throughout the study.
In step (b), the user is made aware that her friend f has
installed an app a0 (Figure 7e) from vendor v. She is asked
to type the name of the app’s vendor (“paste” option was
disabled in the input field to further ensure the participant
is aware of the vendor). In step (c), the user is asked to
install an app with a certain purpose (similar to Figure 7c).
One of the two matching apps is app a0.
Similar to the previous module, the BL group witnessed
an almost even split between “Online Player”, installed pre-
viously by the friend, and “Enjoy Music Player”, from a new
vendor (cf. Table 4. We also noticed that 20 participants in
this group justified their decision by mentioning that their
friend has used the app. Still, neither of them alluded at
Scenario
BL group HB group ∆ p-value
VwA NV VwA NV
Self History 50.0% 50.0% 75.4% 24.6% 25.4% 0.003
Collaborator’s app 52.8% 47.2% 88.4% 11.6% 35.6% < 0.001
Collaborator’s vendor 58.3% 41.7% 82.6% 17.4% 24.3% 0.002
Multiple collaborators 44.4% 55.6% 82.6% 17.4% 38.2% <0.001
Table 4: App selection statistics in the study; VwA: vendor with access; NV : new vendor. The comparisons in each
experimental group were planned contrasts, and the p-values of difference between the percentages of users who selected each
app type were computed using Fisher’s exact test
privacy reasons in their justifications. Instead, the two most
prevalent motivations were (1) considering the friend’s use
of the app as a recommendation or (2) achieving compati-
bility with their friends’ app, which facilitates data sharing
within the app itself. Quoting one user: “This is the same
app my friend is using so it should be quite compatible for
us to both share.”
In addition to having a significant 35.6% difference in the
case of the HB group, we noticed that 32 users mentioned
the existing data access as a reason for choosing the app
“Online Player”. Also, 26 users referred to the fact that
the friend has installed this app before (including those who
mentioned both of the previous reasons). Unlike the BL
group’s justifications though, where the friend’s recommen-
dation and the app’s compatibility prevailed, the privacy
issue was explicitly brought up by at least 10 users. One
participant put it as follows: “Thanks to John, they have
already access to 70% of my data. Sharing the last 30% isn’t
as bad as sharing 100% of my data with driveplayer.com.”
Module 2.2 (Collaborator’s Vendor Scenario): We
proceed in steps (d) and (e) as in the previous scenario’s
steps (b) and (c), with the difference that a new app from v
is included among the options in step (e) instead of the exact
same app a0. One interesting insight from this scenario is
that the line between the company and the app is
blurred in the minds of several users who used the two
entities interchangeably. In fact, 3 users in the BL group
and 7 participants in the HB group justified their choices by
mentioning that their friend installed the same app before,
which was not the case. For example, one user wrote: “this
app already has access to my files, and I don’t want to install
any new app.”
Module 3 (Multiple Collaborators Scenario): Given
collaborators fmore and fless, where the user shares much
more data with fmore, this scenario checks the likelihood of
the participant authorizing an app that fmore has installed.
In step (a), the participant is made aware that fmore has
access to more data than fless (Figure 7f). In steps (b) and
(c), the participant is made familiar with the apps each of
the friends installed (similar to Figure 7e). In step (d), the
user is asked to select an app with a specific purpose. The
two friends’ apps are the only ones matching, and the choice
is to be made between them (similar to Figure 7c).
In the BL group, we had 44.4% of the participants choos-
ing the app installed by fmore. Still this percentage is rela-
tively close to an equal split between the two apps. Out of
this percentage, 13 users justified their choice by mention-
ing that they were encouraged to follow the choice of friend
fmore. Even though they did not mention privacy, the larger
number of files shared with fmore was often used as a jus-
tification. For example, one participant wrote: “This is the
app that John already uses, and he has access to all of my
files. The PDF Mergy app is used by Lisa, but she only has
access to part of my files.”
In the HB group, around 82.6% chose the app previously
installed by the friend fmore, which is significantly more than
those in the BL case (Fisher’s exact test, p-value < 0.001).
Looking at the justifications, around 37 users explicitly men-
tioned the higher access level that this app already possesses
as a reason for their choice. Privacy was additionally men-
tioned by 8 of these users. Quoting one of them: “PDF
Mergy already has access to 70% of my files. Using PDF
Files Merger would unnecessarily increase third party app
access to my files.” However, we still had 2 users who went
for the app with less existing access, with one of them saying
he favors the app that only “had accessed 30% of files before
installation”. What was interesting though is that almost
all users who mentioned friends were actually mak-
ing a comparison between the two friends’ existing
access level, regardless of their final choice.
4.5 Concluding Survey
At the end of the user study, users were presented with a
final set of questions. We asked them whether they would
like to be notified when a friend installs an app that gets
access to their shared files. Around 92% of users in the BL
group and 90% of users in the HB group agreed. We fur-
ther asked the participants whether they are fine with a col-
laborator being notified when they install applications that
access files shared with that collaborator. The percentage
of people who agreed dropped to 75% in the BL and 78%
in the HB group. The relatively small difference between
the answers to these two questions highlights that only a
minority of users is not willing to make the trade-off
of contributing to the overall system. Such users can
be given the option to not use privacy indicators based on
their friends’ decisions.
Next, users were asked the following question“Assume you
have installed an application called YouMusic from a com-
pany called Musicana and gave it access to all your files on
Google Drive. Now you are considering installing an applica-
tion called YouVideo from the same company. How do you
think that this application will affect your privacy:”. Only
11% of each group replied by “negatively”. The vast major-
ity in both groups either perceived the avoidance of a new
vendor as a positive outcome or considered that the privacy
loss will remain the same. Interestingly, the users in the
BL showed a similar reasoning in justifying their choices as
the HB group although the latter were primed about these
aspects via the privacy indicators. This indicates that the
privacy indicators actually match the first intuition
for a large fraction of users.
4.6 Discussion and Limitations
Overall, we found out that, in the three modules, par-
ticipants in the HB group were significantly more likely to
install the app with less privacy loss (i. e., the app from the
vendor with the largest share of the user’s files) than those in
the BL group. Despite showing the efficacy of History-based
Insights, our study still has its limitations. In order to get a
large, diverse sample size, we resorted to a web experiment
based on role-playing with hypothetical data. It would be
interesting to see how such results extrapolate to the case
where users’ own data is in question.
Moreover, in our design, we have abstracted several fac-
tors (e.g., ratings and reviews), which have been previously
studied in similar ecosystems [11], in order to focus on one
factor. These factors might have diluted the effect of the
privacy indicator. Still, we conjecture that, although the
absolute values of our findings might not strictly apply, the
differences between the two groups will still be practically
significant.
Additionally, in this paper, we have investigated only one
type of history-based privacy indicators. Evidently, such in-
dicators can be integrated at different stages of the app in-
stallation process. For example, they can be part of the rec-
ommendation strategy for suggesting alternative apps. They
can also be included in the apps’ search interface. Apps
can also be labelled as “privacy preserving” in the web store
based on this metric. It is also possible that the privacy in-
dicator is only shown when the vendor has existing access to
the user’s data. This might serve to reduce the habituation
effect and the information overload. The best choice among
these deployment scenarios needs further investigation.
Furthermore, it is important to note that, although our ex-
perimental interface mentions the collaborators’ name in the
explanation under the progress bar, this does not have to be
the case in actual deployments. We hypothesize that remov-
ing the name will not have a significant impact on the results
as it was not highlighted in the interface. This allows the
CSP to relay such information to the users without expos-
ing sensitive data about particular collaborators. The CSP
can resort to more sophisticated anonymization methodolo-
gies, such as showing a non-exact percentage that can be
mapped to multiple collaborators. Exploring the impact of
these techniques is left for a future work. Moreover, we note
that this anonymization might not be needed at all in the
enterprise settings, where apps installed by team members
are supposed to be visible for the administrators. As we
show in Section 5.3.2, a significant reduction in privacy loss
can be achieved without even accounting for decisions by
users external to the team.
Finally, the privacy indicator in our study has addressed
two granularity levels: full and per-file access. However,
the same indicator can be extrapolated to the case of per-
type access. For example, the interface can say: “The app’s
company already has access to 70% of your photos” (instead
of files).
5. LARGE NETWORKS’ SIMULATIONS
In the previous section, we showed the significant change
that our privacy indicator can effect through encouraging
users to make History-based decisions. We will tackle the
next research question, where we investigate the impact of
adopting such privacy indicators on the privacy risk in re-
alistic scenarios with large user networks. As we are not in
the position of the CSP to study an actual implementation
of the HB Insights interface over time, we will perform a
simulation of potential users’ installation behavior. We will
base this on both the crowdsourced decision model inferred
from the user study and on new collaboration networks that
we construct.
5.1 Simulation Data
Collaboration Networks: For the purposes of this simu-
lation, we constructed the following three networks:
• Inflated Google Drive Network: We used the stan-
dard degree-driven approach for network topology gener-
ation to construct a larger Google Drive network based
on the one in the PrivySeal Dataset of Section 3.2 [13].
Based on an input user degrees’ distribution from that
dataset, we particularly used the Configuration Model as
described by Newman [14] and implemented by the library
NetworkX [20] for inflating the graph. This model gener-
ates a random pseudograph (a graph with parallel edges
and self-loops) by randomly assigning edges to match an
input degree sequence. We removed the self-loops and
parallel edges a posteriori from the generated graph. In
the end, we had a collaboration graph with 18,000 users
and 138,440 edges. This graph is, by construction, a con-
nected graph, with an average node degree of 15.
• Paper Collaboration Network: In an effort to have
a realistic, large collaboration network without resorting
to graph inflation, we relied on the Microsoft Academic
Graph, which consists of records of scientific papers along
with the authors and their affiliations [21]. We used a
snapshot of 50,000 papers, and we constructed the col-
laboration graph based on it. We ended up with 41,000
collaborators and 199,980 edges. The graph itself is not
a connected graph but is rather constructed of around
1700 connected components. The average node degree is
4. Our rationale is that this graph captures a realistic
scenario of users collaborating on authoring documents,
which is, in fact, an activity achieved via cloud services
nowadays. Hence, it is fit for showing the efficacy of our
privacy indicators.
• Team Collaboration Network: We used the same aca-
demic graph in order to construct a network of teams.
A team is defined as a frequently collaborating group of
people. Motivated by research around community detec-
tion [12], we use Strongly Connected Components (SCCs)
in order to label teams in our graph. We ended up with
16,400 users split over 1700 teams. Unlike the previous
two networks where users themselves are the data sub-
jects (whose privacy is to be optimized), members of each
team in this network consider their team as the data sub-
ject.
Sharing and Installation Patterns: In order to closely
model the user characteristics in Google Drive, we assigned
to each user in the collaboration networks a file sharing dis-
tribution and a number of apps corresponding to a user with
a matching degree in the PrivySeal Dataset.
Apps: As we wanted to perform the simulation with a
much larger number of users than we had in the dataset
described in Section 3.2, we also needed a larger collection
of apps. Given that Google Chrome Store has only around
500 apps that are tagged by the “Works with Google Drive”
tag, we decided to also include all Google Chrome Apps in
the dataset (i. e., even those that do not have this tag). As
far as the simulation is concerned, this step is justified since
the only realistic information that we will rely on is the dis-
tribution of vendors per app. It is fair then to assume that
this distribution does not differ significantly between the
general category and the Google Drive category. Hence, we
augmented the PrivySeal Dataset via apps from the Google
Chrome Store to arrive at 1000 apps. In addition to the
app’s installation count and vendor name, we also collected
the set of “Related Apps” that the store displays for each
app. This is because, in our simulation, we will assume that
users have the choice to choose the app itself or one of its re-
lated apps. Again, this is a fair assumption as these related
apps are mostly the apps which deliver a close functionality
to the app itself, and we will only rely on them to model the
alternatives at each simulation step.
User Decision Models: For the purpose of this simula-
tion, we define 3 user decision models:
• Fully Aware Model (FA): the user always makes the
decision that minimizes the privacy loss of the data sub-
ject, taking into account all previous installation decisions
by her and by her collaborators.
• Experimental History-based Model (EHB): the user
takes decisions similar to what a random user of the HB
experimental group does. In specific, we model those users
as taking a history-based decision with probability q and
making a random app choice with probability 1 − q. We
set q based on the number of users who mentioned the
app’ existing access in writing as a reason for their choice
in each module of Section 4. Based on Module 1’s users’
responses, we set q = 0.57 when the user encounters a ven-
dor she previously authorized. Based on Module 2, we set
q = 0.70 whenever the user is presented with one vendor
previously authorized by a single collaborator. Based on
Module 3, we set q = 0.67 for the cases where the user is
presented with multiple vendors previously authorized by
her collaborators. In all of these cases, the user will select
the vendor with the minimal resulting Aggregate VFCu
with probability q.
• Experimental Baseline Model (EBL): the user
takes decisions similar to what a random user of the BL
experimental group does. As users in practice are rarely
informed of what their friends have installed before, we
do not integrate this knowledge into the model. Hence,
we only account for the case of Module 1, where the user’s
previous decisions are concerned. Based on the fraction
of users who mentioned the app’s existing access as a mo-
tivation for their choice, we set the probability of taking
history-based decision in this model as q = 0.18.
In the special case of the team collaboration network,
users who take history-based decisions account for their own
decisions and the decisions of their team members only. We
do not consider that users account for decisions taken by
members of other teams. This is to demonstrate the poten-
tial of the privacy indicators under strict conditions.
5.2 Simulation Details
We now move to the description of the simulation itself,
which is detailed in Algorithm 1. We had three simulation
groups, named after the three decision models: FA group,
EHB group, and the EBL group. The simulation was run
until the average number of apps installed across by users
reached 30 apps7. On a high level, at each simulation step,
the following actions are performed:
• A user is selected from the collaboration network via a
weighted random sampling based on the assigned app in-
stallation frequencies (line 3). This accounts for the diver-
sity of users’ installation frequencies. An app a0 is selected
from the simulation apps’ dataset via a weighted random
sampling based on the actual app installations count in
Google Chrome Store (line 4). That way, popular apps
are installed more frequently (as is the case in practice).
• A user decision is simulated. The user is assumed to be
choosing the app a0 or one of its related apps. This choice
is made depending on the user’s decision model, as ex-
plained previously.
• Finally, the average Aggregate VFC is computed based on
all users’ Aggregate VFCu.
5.3 Simulation Results
To demonstrate the simulation results, we show three types
of figures per collaboration network. On a high level, in Fig-
ures 8a, 9a, and 10a, we show how the privacy loss (quanti-
fied using the average Aggregate-VFC ) in each group evolves
as users install more apps. In Figures 8b, 9b, and 10b,
we show ratios of the privacy loss in the two experimen-
tal groups EHB and FA with respect to the baseline EBL
group. Finally, Figures 8c and 9c, and 10c show the actual
events contributing to the privacy loss growth, where we can
specifically check the fraction of apps coming from new ven-
dors, those coming from vendors previously authorized by
the user, and those from vendors previously authorized by
collaborators.
5.3.1 Results for Individuals’ Networks
Based on these metrics we start by analyzing the results
for the individuals’ networks, where we observe the follow-
ing:
Curtailed growth of privacy loss: From Figures 8a and 9a,
we notice that the growth of the privacy loss is visibly cur-
tailed in the cases of EHB and FA groups compared to the
baseline EBL group. This significant divergence demon-
strates the efficacy of our HB privacy indicators.
Impact of the network effect: Looking into the ratios
in Figures 8b and 9b, we see that the privacy loss in the
EHB group has dropped by 41% in the inflated network
7Comparatively, mobile users have accessed 26.7 smartphone
apps on average per month in the fourth quarter of 2014 [24].
Algorithm 1 Simulation Steps
1: Initialize VFCu value to 0 for each user
2: for t ← 0 to N do . N is total number of steps
3: select a random user u0 based on user’s app installation frequency
4: select a random new app a0 based on app’s installation count
5: Arel := {a0} ∪ (set of related apps of a0)
6: Vrel := set of vendors of apps in Arel
7: r := a random rational number in the range [0,1]
8: if user had installed apps by vendors in V ′ ⊂ Vrel then
9: if (r < q(group,‘same vendor’)) then . q is a function of the user decision model; group is the experimental group
10: select a random vendor vˆ ∈ V ′
11: install the app aˆ in Arel from vendor vˆ
12: else
13: install app a0
14: end if
15: else if ∃ (c ∈ C(u0) who installed apps by vendors in V ′ ⊂ Vrel) then
16: compute VFCu0({v}) for each vendor v in V ′ at this time step
17: select the vendor vˆ ∈ V ′ with highest VFCu0({v}) at this time step
18: if (r < q(group,‘collaborator vendor’)) then
19: install the app aˆ in Arel from vendor vˆ
20: else
21: install app a0
22: end if
23: else
24: install app a0
25: end if
26: for all u ∈ {u0} ∪ C(u0) do
27: update Aggregate VFCu for u . recompute it via Equation 2.4
28: end for
29: update the average Aggregate VFC over all users
30: end for
and by 28% in the authors-based network (both with re-
spect to the baseline). In the FA group, where users always
optimize their privacy, the privacy loss has dropped by 70%
in the inflated network and by 40% in the authors-based
network. This higher impact in the case of the inflated net-
work is due to the fact that it is a connected graph, unlike
the authors-based network, which is composed of smaller
connected components. Nevertheless, we can state that, al-
though our privacy indicators have a larger effect on highly
connected networks, they are still significantly effective in
less connected networks, like the authors-based dataset.
Importance of accounting for collaborators’ decisions:
To dive further into events that lead to the observed privacy
loss patterns, we look into Figures 8c and 9c. First, we ob-
serve that users in the EBL group are mainly installing new
apps from vendors that had no previous access to their data.
This is reflected in the almost linear increase of privacy loss
in Figures 8a and 9a. Second, we observe that, in the case
of the inflated network, users have been frequently installing
apps from vendors with existing access through their collab-
orators. In fact, as apparent in Figure 8c, this event outnum-
bers the event of installing from a new vendor. Third, the
number of installations from collaborators’ vendors is also
significant in the case of the authors-based dataset. While
it does not outnumber the installations from new vendors
(due to the low-graph connectivity), this is still enough to
lead to 28% and 40% decrease in the privacy loss in the
EHB and the FA groups respectively. Finally, we note that,
although the users are more frequently encountering ven-
dors authorized by their collaborators than by themselves,
the latter event is still significantly impacting the results.
This is because users still incur an incremental privacy loss
with vendors authorized by their collaborators while this loss
is zero with vendors they have previously authorized. Ac-
cordingly, the obtained optimizations are a result of users’
accounting for their own and for others’ decisions.
5.3.2 Results for the Teams’ Network
We now discuss the results for the case of the collaboration
network where users work in teams and aim to protect the
privacy of the team’s data. We observe the following, based
on Figure 10:
Inherent usage of similar apps: From Figure 10c, it is
clear that the dominant event is that of users installing apps
which have been authorized by other team members before.
This is even in the case of the baseline group (EBL), which
was not the case in the individuals’ networks. We justify
that by the fact that we selected apps at each simulation step
to match their realistic installation frequencies. In practice,
apps’ installation counts follow a long-tail distribution, and
users tend to mostly install a limited set of apps. That is
why team members will naturally tend to install a set of
similar apps.
Curtailed growth of privacy loss: Still, we observe that
the trend of slower growth of privacy loss also applies in the
case of teams (Figure 10a). As we also observe in Figure 10b,
the privacy loss has decreased by 23% for the EHB group
and by 45% for the FA group, both with respect to the
(a) VFC evolution
(b) Evolution of the ratios
w.r.t. the EBL group (c) Evolution of the types of installation events
Figure 8: Simulation results in the inflated network
(a) VFC evolution
(b) Evolution of the ratios
w.r.t. the EBL group (c) Evolution of the types of installation events
Figure 9: Simulation results in the author-based network
(a) VFC evolution
(b) Evolution of the ratios
w.r.t. the EBL group (c) Simulation results in the teams’ network
Figure 10: Simulation results in the teams’ network
baseline group. This implies that there is an ample room
for privacy optimization in teams too.
Effect due to internal collaborators: We finally observe
that the privacy loss decrease was achieved via decisions
taken by each team’s members independently, without rely-
ing on other teams’ decisions. This highlights the fact that
HB privacy indicators can still be effective even when users
do not account for others’ decisions. Obviously, taking the
external members’ decisions into account can lead to further
optimizations.
In sum, our simulations provide further evidence of the
efficacy of using History-based privacy indicators in a large
network of collaborators. It is worth noting too that, al-
though users in our study were following the EHB decision
model, we believe that, in an actual deployment of such indi-
cators, the model will move closer to the FA model. This is
because users are more protective when their personal data
is at risk than when they are put in a role playing scenario
about fictitious data. Moreover, users in our study were ex-
posed to this indicator for the first time. When users are
educated more about this feature, they might be more likely
to take advantage of it.
6. RELATEDWORK
6.1 Interdependent Privacy
The problem of interdependent privacy has been tackled
before in the context of social apps. The main approaches
were high-level game-theoretic or economic modeling. In [2],
the authors introduced the concept of interdependent pri-
vacy and modeled its impact via a game theoretic, (2-player,
1-app) model. The work by Pu and Grossklags [16] pre-
sented a more elaborate economic model that additionally
accounts for the interplay among various social network pa-
rameters. They showed that app rankings do not accurately
reflect the level of interdependent privacy harm the app can
cause and that even rational users who consider their friends’
well-being might adopt apps with invasive privacy practices.
Evidently, these results do not apply in the cloud apps case,
where all apps have the potential to inflict interdependent
privacy harm.
A later work by Pu and Grossklags [17] used a conjoint
study approach to quantify the monetary value which in-
dividuals associate with their friends’ personal data. They
found that individuals place a significantly higher value on
their own personal information than their friends’ personal
information. This further supports our assumption of self-
interested users in this work. The same authors also built
on a user survey in [18] to assess the factors affecting users’
own privacy concerns as well as friends’ privacy concerns in
the context of social app adoption. In particular, they found
evidence of negative association between past privacy inva-
sion experiences and the trust in 3rd party apps handling of
their own data. They also found partial support for a pos-
itive effect of privacy knowledge on concerns for users’ own
privacy and their friends’ privacy.
Other works have also investigated the issue of interde-
pendent privacy in the context of location privacy [15] and
genomic privacy [10]. In this work, we are focused on quanti-
fying the interdependence of privacy in the context of cloud
apps before addressing it from a usable privacy perspective,
thus bridging the gap between the theoretical studies and
the end-user needs.
6.2 Apps Privacy Indicators
Our previous work [9] was the first to study the privacy of
3rd party cloud apps and to expose that almost two thirds
of those apps are over-privileged. In that work, we intro-
duced a novel privacy indicator for deterring users from in-
stalling over-privileged apps by showing them Far-reaching
insights that apps can needlessly infer from their data (e. g.,
top topics, faces, or locations of interest). In the context
of Android apps, Kelly et al., showed that, by adding a set
of privacy facts about an app, users will be more likely to
choose apps with fewer permissions [11]. Harbach et al.,
tackled the same problem but presented users with random
examples from their data (e. g., pictures, contacts, etc.) [7].
Almuhimedi et al. showed the effectiveness of privacy
nudges, which regularly alert users about sensitive data col-
lected by their apps, in encouraging users to review and ad-
just their permission [1]. All these works, however, tackle the
problem of over-privileged apps and try to lead the user into
either avoiding them or adjusting their permissions when-
ever possible. Our current work helps users improve their
privacy by reducing the vendors with access to their data,
even if the functionality delivered by the vendor abides by
the least-privilege principle. Hence, it complements these
approaches and can be deployed alongside any of them.
7. CONCLUSION
The findings in this work are the first to concretely delin-
eate the various aspects of interdependent privacy in 3PC
apps. One of the major outcomes is that a user’s collabora-
tors can be much more detrimental to her privacy than her
own decisions. Consequently, accounting for collaborators’
decisions should be a key component of future privacy indi-
cators in 3rd party cloud apps. We have shown the impact of
History-based Insights as a privacy enhancing technology in
this context, especially that, based on our user study, users
are less likely to account for previous decisions on their own.
Our privacy indicators would optimally be implemented by
the CSPs themselves as they control the authorization in-
terface and the application stores. The indicators can also
be realized by third party privacy providers with access to
users’ data. Our approach can also be easily mapped to
other ecosystems. In the mobile apps’ scenario, it can en-
able users to reduce the number of vendors with access to
her contacts. It can also be extended to the case where the
goal is protection against 4th parties (e.g., ad providers and
data brokers). There, the user can account for data previ-
ously held by a 4th party with which the app vendor coop-
erates. Finally, due to their usability and effectiveness, we
envision History-based Insights as an important technique
within the movement from static privacy indicators towards
dynamic privacy assistants that lead users to data-driven
privacy decisions.
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9. PROOFOFOPTIMALUSER STRATEGY
In this section, we complement Section 4.1 by providing
a proof the optimal user strategy for minimizing the pri-
vacy risk, given our assumptions. We follow the notation
introduced in Section 2. Let us consider that each 3PC app
vendor has a probability p of exposing users’ data. As we do
not assume that users are provided with a per-vendor risk
estimation utility, we set this probability to be the same for
all vendors. In general, at a time t, a user u would have
exposed her data to a set V of vendors, such that each ven-
dor v has access to a fraction fu,v(t) =
|Fu,v(t)|
|Fu| of the files.
Without loss of generality, we will consider henceforth that
the user has an all-files privacy goal (cf. Section 2.2). How-
ever, the same reasoning applies in the case of a per-type
privacy goal. In that case, we simply replace “files” by “files
of a specific type” (e.g. photos, documents). We will also
be assuming that the users themselves are the data subjects
(i. e., we consider individual-level subjects).
For a vendor v, we quantify the user’s privacy risk mag-
nitude as p ∗ fu,v(t), i. e., the fraction of user files possessed
by the vendor multiplied by the probability that the vendor
exposes the user’s files. This vendor could have obtained
access due to app installations by the user herself or by her
collaborators. A user’s privacy risk magnitude at time t
can thus be defined as the sum of the risk magnitude across
vendors in V : Risk(t) =
∑
v∈V p ∗ fu,v(t).
When a user installs an app from a vendor vˆ at time t+1,
the vendor gets access to the whole set of user’s files. Hence,
the risk magnitude is increased by p ∗ (1 − fu,vˆ(t)). Given
that p is constant, the risk magnitude can be minimized
by choosing vˆ, such that vˆ = arg maxv fu,v(t) (which can
also be written as vˆ = arg maxv VFCu({v}, t)). Hence, the
optimal, greedy strategy to minimize the risk is to select the
vendor that already has the largest fraction of user files, thus
minimizing p ∗ (1− fu,vˆ(t)). We call this strategy: “History-
based decisions”.
